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From Spitfires to DragonFire: Rebuilding Allied Defence Industry Credibility by 2027

Author: Robin Ashby, Secretary General Eurodefense-UK

In June 1941, with Britain standing alone against Hitler, Winston Churchill famously said: “Give us the tools, and we will finish the job.” But that promise relied on more than courage—it depended on a reoriented economy and an agile defence industry that could deliver speed, scale, and innovation under pressure.

Today, we face a similar challenge. Only now, the tools we need are not just tanks and aircraft but software-defined systems, multi-domain capabilities, resilient supply chains, and the human talent to operate and evolve them. We also face a hard deadline. Not a speculative horizon, but a rapidly approaching point: 2027.

In recent months, senior leaders from NATO capitals have begun to treat 2027 as more than a milestone—it is the year by which Russian forces are expected to regenerate sufficient offensive capability to pose renewed threat to European stability. This estimate, echoed by figures such as William Hague and EU Defence Commissioner Thierry Breton, has catalysed a growing realisation: if Allied defence and industrial systems remain as they are—slow, fragmented, and reactive—we will not be ready.

In June 2025, I delivered a speech at a NATO Fringe Meeting in The Hague hosted by the Turkish Atlantic Association. My message was clear: we are not moving fast enough. What’s required now is a wartime mindset in peacetime conditions. Not panic—but purposeful urgency.

Here, I want to expand those remarks into a wider reflection for the defence and security community—particularly those in government, industry, and uniform—who recognise that the battlespace is changing faster than we are.

1. The Speed Gap Between Innovation and Acquisition

We have never had more innovation flowing from commercial and defence-adjacent sectors. Startups are producing rapid advances in AI, autonomy, cyber, and space tech. But our systems of procurement, certification, and deployment remain stuck in a bygone era.

Consider DragonFire—a British directed energy weapon originally scheduled for service in the 2030s. Through focused collaboration and political pressure, it’s now on track for initial capability by 2027. This isn’t just an outlier—it’s proof that when we cut through bureaucracy and back industry decisively, we can move at speed.

History echoes this lesson. In 1938, Britain had just 30 Spitfires. By the end of 1940, we had over 2,000. More than 20,000 were produced by the end of WWII, powered by a restructured industrial base. Shadow factories, subcontractors, and integrated design pipelines accelerated delivery.

We need a modern equivalent: modular design, digital twins, adaptive manufacturing, and government-industry operating models that support rapid development without sacrificing rigour. Speed and safety must coexist.

2. Fragmentation is the Allied Blind Spot

NATO’s biggest advantage should be scale and interoperability. But in practice, we are often hamstrung by disjointed national standards, misaligned procurement timelines, and siloed sustainment models.

Our coalition aircraft in a contested airspace may be equipped with NATO LINK 16, US TTNT, French ROVER, and SATURN radios—all of which require bridging, converting, or simply avoiding. The result? Reduced effectiveness, wasted time, and operational risk.

By 2027, we need an agreed Allied interoperability framework: shared architectures, co-developed components, export assurances, and transparent system roadmaps. This isn’t just a technical exercise. It’s a matter of trust, political will, and shared deterrence credibility.

Multinational testbeds and joint digital simulations can help—but only if we also align sustainment, spares, and training pipelines. This means procurement by design—not by convenience.

3. Talent is the Disappearing Edge

Defence innovation, production, and sustainment depend on highly skilled people—scientists, software engineers, data analysts, systems integrators, nuclear engineers, composite welders, precision machinists. Yet across the Alliance, we are losing them to commercial tech, retirement, and inertia.

We cannot build a resilient industrial base without tackling this head-on. That means:

  • Restoring pride and purpose in defence-related careers
  • Incentivising apprenticeships and scholarships in priority disciplines
  • Creating modern, flexible employment models
  • Providing long-term upskilling pipelines, not short-term hiring sprees
  • Ensuring fair ownership models for innovation and IP

The UK’s WWII Air Transport Auxiliary—the “ATA girls”—ferried aircraft across the country under dangerous conditions. Many had never flown those types before. They learned by doing, driven by necessity. Today, our battlespace may be more digital than physical, but it still demands that same spirit—and far better preparation.

4. Supply Chain Resilience: From Afterthought to Capability

The wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and the COVID-19 pandemic before them, have shown us how fragile the globalised “just-in-time” model really is. From semiconductors to rare earth elements, spare parts to basic propellants, our logistics chains are vulnerable to shocks and manipulation.

For too long, supply chain resilience has been treated as a background issue. It is, in fact, a frontline capability.

By 2027, every Allied nation should have:

  • Mapped its industrial dependencies across critical components
  • Stockpiled essential items based on real demand data
  • Developed surge contracts and sovereign onshoring capacity
  • Built dual-source options into key designs
  • Invested in supply chain telemetry and real-time risk modelling

Governments, as monopoly buyers, must lead this. The free market alone will not deliver resilience. Strategic contracts and readiness-based incentives must fill that gap.

5. The Role of Government: From Procurement to Partnership

We often speak of “industry” as if it operates independently from state direction. But in defence, governments are not just customers—they are partners, planners, and enablers.

That role must evolve. Instead of issuing capability requirements and waiting years for delivery, governments should:

  • Set clear, timed targets for key capabilities
  • Fund scale-up and experimentation simultaneously
  • Streamline acquisition pathways without sacrificing accountability
  • Use multi-year funding to unlock private investment
  • Back international co-development with shared IP protocols

This is not a call for nationalisation. It’s a call for strategic orchestration.

6. Intellectual Property and Sovereignty: Smarter Sharing

Finally, the thorny but essential question of IP and sovereignty. Nations are rightly protective of key technologies—but when this becomes an excuse for duplication and delay, we all suffer.

We need new models: escrowed IP, joint development incentives, co-licensing regimes, and real deterrents against misuse. The Eurodrone’s sluggish progress offers a cautionary tale. AUKUS Pillar II, despite political turbulence, offers a more promising template for trusted collaboration.

We cannot afford to relearn this lesson by 2027. We need to act on it now.

Conclusion: The 2027 Test

2027 is not far away. Reconstituted adversaries, accelerating technologies, and increasingly contested global norms mean that time is now our most strategic resource.

To be ready, we must:

  • Reform procurement for speed and flexibility
  • Align standards and schedules across Allies
  • Win and retain the next generation of defence talent
  • Harden our supply chains against disruption
  • Treat government as a strategic partner, not just a buyer
  • Balance sovereignty with smart collaboration

We have done it before. In the 1940s, against far worse odds, the Allied nations mobilised their economies, their industries, and their people to defeat tyranny. The world is watching to see if we can summon that resolve again—before we are forced to learn the lesson the hard way.

The tools must come first. Only then can we finish the job.

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UK & Europe: friends and neighbours (2)

Author: Nicholas Watt

*This article was written in a personal capacity and does not necessarily reflect ED policy

The November edition of Commentary (edition no. 2) focussed on the importance of the UK and our EU neighbours securing a good relationship in the light of a new Westminster government. Events have moved on, but it might be opportune to re-visit this subject, owing to the way matters are developing.

The idea of European Strategic Autonomy has been further underlined by the recent actions of the US government. The Draghi paper of September 2024 looks to be a prescient piece of analysis, the recent promulgation of the European Commission’s ‘White book’ on the future of European defence industry provides policy makers with a framework to develop some of the Draghi reports ideas.

Despite the efforts of the UK’s prime minister to gather a coalition of the willing to support any cease fire in Ukraine, it seems that his reward is to be cold shouldered by our European partners. Perhaps this was to be expected, but it is disappointing never the less. There are two elements to the recent European proposal, and it may yet be possible for the UK to persuade our European partners on the merits of allowing the UK to participate more fully.

ReArm Europe

The joint white paper was published on the 19 th of March, under the rubric of Readiness 2030. It borrows a lot of the arguments advanced in the earlier Draghi Report on EU competitiveness. This paper is a discussion document, not the finished product. In the politics of the EU, the European Commission publishes papers which are then discussed by the Member States, prior to their adoption and subsequent enactment.

Amidst the language of the White Paper for European Defence – the white book, is reference to the closer involvement of Ukraine for the purposes of EU instruments. As presently proposed, Ukraine will not be eligible for any SAFE loans, but would be eligible to participate in some other EU funded measures.

SAFE

As part of the announcement on the 19th March the European Commission brought forward a proposal for a new financial instrument – the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan plan. This proposed instrument is based on the European Commission issuing up to EUR 150 billion of loans, until the end of the decade to help EU states increase expenditure on common defence procurement.

It is part of a broader package that includes exempting defense spending from EU budget limits, and channeling private funding toward the defense industry. The EC outlines its ambitions as:

“The pillars of the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 are designed to utilise all immediately available levers to mobilise up to €800 billion for defence investments, structured around the following: 

  • Unleash the use of public funding in defence at national level 
  • A new dedicated instrument for Security Action for Europe – SAFE – to carry out urgent and massive defence investment through common procurement  
  • Leveraging on the EIB Group and mobilising private capital by accelerating the Savings and Investments Union” 

A lot of the language of these proposals relates to EU funding mechanisms, and internal market barriers to transfers of equipment between EU Member States. The EC is acting as an ‘enabler’ with ultimate spending decisions remaining with Member States who have the competency to deal with matters of national defence.

Context

On the 6 th March the European Council conclusions devoted themselves to the matter of European defence. Beginning with a reminder of the Versailles Declaration of March 2022, which outlined the EU’s proposed response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine; fast forward to the present and we see the results of this activity in the Defence White book and the SAFE package.

In September 2024, the EC published the Draghi report on European competitiveness, much of which was concerned with making Europe less reliant on imported defence equipment, most of which comes from the US. This report helps to shape the politics of the recent announcements. The ambition is understandable; to respond to Russian aggression, to answer the calls from the Trump administration about European fee riders. Also to enable European defence contractors to respond to the new demands for increased defence expenditure without distorting national defence budgets.

Capability gaps

The white paper identifies the following capability gaps:

  • Air and missile defence:
  • Artillery systems:
  • Ammunition and missiles:
  • Drones and counter-drone systems:
  • Military Mobility:
  • AI, Quantum, Cyber & Electronic Warfare:
  • Strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection:

The white book’s reference to the UK repays some study:

“The United Kingdom is an essential European ally with which cooperation on security and defence should be enhanced in mutual interest, starting with a potential Security and Defence partnership. Building on the set of solid agreements in place, bilateral security and defence cooperation can expand, ranging from external crisis management to defence industrial policies.”

This would appear to leave the door open to co-operation in the near future, if the EU & the UK can agree on the rights terms for the UK to participate in future European defence projects. Concerning the eligibility of UK based companies to participate in projects funded by the SAFE arrangement the language currently states that;
“The cost of components originating in the Union, in EEA EFTA States or Ukraine shall not be lower than 65 % of the estimated cost of the end product. No component shall be sourced from another third country that contravenes the security and defence interests of the Union or its Member States.” [Article 16.8]

Furthermore:
“The Union may conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with like-minded countries, namely acceding countries, candidate countries other than Ukraine and potential candidates, and other third countries with whom the Union has entered a Security and Defence Partnership…. in order to open the eligibility conditions referred to in Article 16 to the possibility to fulfil the criterion of location, origin or place of establishment to those countries and their territories, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3, whenever these countries participate in a common procurement under the SAFE instrument.” [Article 17.1]

Comment

Politics is the art of the possible. It ought to be possible for the EU and the UK to find enough common ground to conclude a security and defence agreement in the near future. The urgency of the situation requires both engagement at the highest level, as well as a measure of statesmanship from prime ministers and presidents.

In the first instance, any agreement should focus on joint efforts to address the capability gaps identified by the white book. This will demonstrate the UK’s ability to ‘add value’. At present it would seem that 35% of the value of eligible projects to be funded by the SAFE instrument can come from non EU sources, including the UK. This could be enhanced if agreement can be reached.

Reports that the French government wish to use this programme as a bargaining chip to secure concessions from the UK government on access to UK fishing grounds sound plausible. It must be hoped that wise heads will prevail, and that the UK government will remind its EU partners of the seriousness of the matter in hand. Good fences may make for good neighbours, but there is no need to build a fence that is too high.

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UK defence industry: friends and neighbours?

Author: Nicholas Watt

*This article was written in a personal capacity and does not necessarily reflect ED policy

The previous edition of Commentary referred to the importance of the UK’s defence industry. This edition will re-visit this topic, mindful of the current world situation and what other countries are doing to develop and protect their own defence industries. It should not be assumed by the new UK government that warm words about resetting relationships with our friends and neighbours removes the element of competition between allies that has characterised our ‘friendly’ relations for many years.

Howard Wheeldon was a vocal supporter of British industry, something the revived Commentary will endeavour to emulate. In particular, we need to be aware of the risk that while the MOD is conducting its Strategic Defence Review, events are moving on – at pace. There is a risk that the SDR may be answering a question that is already out of date.

There is now an obvious and urgent need for a revitalised ‘European Pillar’. The outbreak of war in Ukraine is the driver of renewed and heightened operational co-operation with our European allies. Almost as much as the prospect of another Trump presidency. The UK and our European allies will need to prove that we are looking after our own backyard by raising the level of our defence expenditure. Moreover we need a credible deterrent capability, which requires renewed efforts in the defence manufacturing field, as well as the rapidly evolving world of MilTech.

Whilst the UK remains in the vanguard of support for Ukraine, our EU partners are pursuing their own agenda. In order to strengthen its European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB), the EU has created various instruments, such as the European Defence Fund, the European Peace Facility, the Permanent Structured Cooperation in 2017, and the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the Cyber Defence Strategy in 2022.

The effect of Brexit has been to exclude the UK from participation in these developments. The new UK government may wish to renew its efforts to develop the provisions of the Political Declaration which is
part of the 2020 Withdrawal Agreement: “The future relationship should benefit from research and industrial cooperation between the Parties’ entities in specific European collaborative projects to facilitate interoperability and to promote joint effectiveness of Armed Forces. In this regard, while both Parties should preserve their respective strategic autonomy and freedom of action underpinned by their respective robust domestic defence industrial bases, the Parties agree to enable to the extent possible under the conditions of Union law:
 the United Kingdom’s collaboration in relevant existing and future projects of the European Defence Agency (EDA) through an Administrative Arrangement;
 the participation of eligible United Kingdom entities in collaborative defence projects bringing together Union entities supported by the European Defence Fund (EDF); and
 the United Kingdom’s collaboration in projects in the framework of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), where invited to participate on an exceptional basis by the Council of the European Union in PESCO format.”

Subsequent developments, notably the recent Draghi report have sought to reinforce the EU’s efforts to achieve strategic autonomy. The Report, published in September 2024, aims to increase the EU’s competitiveness, but also addresses the need for EU Member States to pool their defence manufacturing and acquisition programmes, to reduce dependency on the US in particular: “Peace is the first and foremost objective of Europe. But physical security threats are rising and we must prepare. The EU is collectively the world’s second largest military spender, but it is not reflected in the strength of our defence industrial capacity…… The defence industry is too fragmented, hindering its ability to produce at scale, and it suffers from a lack of standardisation and interoperability of equipment, weakening Europe’s ability to act as a cohesive power. For example, twelve different types of battle tanks are operated in Europe, whereas the US produces only one.”

A policy paper published in October 2024 by the European Peoples Party, the largest group in the newly re-elected European Parliament echoes the sentiments of the Draghi Report, by renewing calls for a European Single Market for defence. It reminds its audience that EU member States still acquire 78% of their military equipment from non EU sources. Also published in October 2024, a report by the London based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), draws attention to the effect that the European defence Fund (EDF) might have on access for ‘third country’ entities in EDF projects.

In the light of the changed strategic environment following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it would make perfect sense for the UK and the EU to co-operate more closely, 23 members of the EU are also members of the NATO Alliance. Matters to be considered would include research and development efforts to identify future technologies, as well as harmonising future capability requirements. However, attention needs to be paid to such matters as the preservation of Intellectual Property (IP) and export licensing. Any negotiations would need to safeguard UK industry from ‘non-tariff’ barriers imposed by EU regulations, or export restrictions. As we have seen from events in Ukraine, a credible deterrence is cheaper than the cost of re-construction following a major war. Whatever the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia will remain a belligerent neighbour. The UK and the EU should recognise their shared interest in ensuring that Europe remains free.

Defence manufacturers will continue to invest and develop new capabilities as the strategic environment evolves. The advent of drones and counter drone technology has altered the calculation of government, but does not remove the necessity for the basic tools of warfare, particularly artillery. A consolidation of suppliers within Europe has long been discussed. Governments, however, like to keep jobs and technology under their control. The Draghi report refers to the difference between the US which operates one type of battle tank, while EU Member States operate 12. This is not a new idea, but it has come back to haunt policy makers, thanks to events in Ukraine. Pressure on governments, including the UK, to ensure that taxpayers’ money is well spent may give this idea new impetus. Defence manufacturers may need to consider the benefits of more joint ventures on a project by project basis, to pool the costs of the R & D necessary to develop new capabilities and technologies such as A I.

There was a large scale consolidation of defence manufacturers following the end of the Cold War. It is unlikely that the number of major prime contractors will diminish, but we may see the upsurge of new MilTech based prime contractors. In the same way, there may be a re-shuffling of second tier contractors, as they adjust to the advent of new technology. This matter will be explored further in a subsequent Commentary, but the UK government must not bargain away the strength of the defence manufacturing sector for the sake of a catchy political deal with our EU neighbours.

The new government has made a good start by signing a defence co-operation agreement with Germany, the Trinity House Agreement, in October. Part of this agreement will see the UK and Germany co-operate on future unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) as well as exploring and developing new maritime unscrewed air systems (UAS) capability. As with the Lancaster House Treaty with France, this is a bilateral arrangement. It does not change the EU’s overall strategy aimed at achieving strategic autonomy.

Equally, the UK government should beware of putting all of its eggs into the US basket. If a future US administration, in the name of supporting jobs imposes tariffs, this could adversely affect both UK prime contractors and the wider supply chain. Those with long memories may remember the Skybolt episode, when the UK government undertook to buy a stand-off nuclear capability from the US. The US government cancelled the project, due to cost and technical problems, leaving the UK in the lurch. This
resulted in the subsequent Nassau agreement where MacMillan and Kennedy agreed that the UK would be given US Polaris missiles for its nuclear capability. We must hope that the AUKUS alliance does not
unravel under similar cost pressures.

In the same vein the Tempest / GCAP programme must be sustained, to ensure that the UK has a credible next generation combat air capability, as well as safeguarding jobs and export opportunities. GCAP and AUKUS are both good examples of why the defence sector has been recognised by the new UK government as drivers of its growth agenda. The sector was mentioned in the green paper released on October 24 th as one of eight growth driving sectors. The UK Defence Solutions Centre (UKDSC) maintains a Joint Economic Data Hub (JEDHub) which policy makers can use to understand the value of the defence sector to the UK economy. The most recent statistics, released earlier in 2024, show that
the UK defence sector employs over 417,000 people. This message needs to permeate into both the Treasury, as well as into the Business Department, as the next spending review is being considered.

The UK government must recognise that any conversations with our friends and neighbours about future co-operation in the defence and security domain should be conducted from a position of strength. The UK has long held a wider world view than many of our European neighbours. The days of a foreign policy based on boosterism alone are past, but there is no doubt the UK has cards to play internationally. Our network of alliances gives us an entrée into many overseas markets, and defence co-operation reinforces our security, as the efforts to support Ukraine have shown. There is goodwill for the UK world-wide, and this must not be traded away in the name of short term gain.

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War by other means

AS90 in Ukraine

Author: Nicholas Watt

In 1649 an English composer called Thomas Tomkins wrote a work “for these distracted times” – he was writing at the time of the English civil war. With a war in Europe and with tensions in the Middle east and the South China Sea and occasional outbursts of violence around the world, 2024 may well be characterised as a distracted year.

The war in Ukraine has shaken the west out of a complacent attitude towards defence and security policy thinking. Pundits and politicians became comfortable debating whether they could afford a 2% GDP commitment to defence spending when there are so many other demands on the public purse. The lack of readiness of many western armed forces was not seen as a matter requiring urgent attention.

The zeitenwende resulting from the outbreak of war in Europe has seen policy makers and commentators rediscover the importance of old fashioned conventional war planning and also the need for readiness and capability. However much the level of defence spending might have to rise to, deterrence is cheaper than the costs of reconstruction following a major war.

In parallel with the efforts to support Ukraine in its fight to repel the invader, Europe has found that its discussions about strategic autonomy have become secondary to the need for a closer engagement with the United States. A new Cold War means that the Atlantic Alliance has become more significant in European thinking about its defence and security policy.

But – western policy makers and politicians fall to easily into the trap of thinking that the calculations being made by autocrats around the world fit into the same worldview as their own. The west invested a lot of resources into developing a military that is high tech to secure an advantage over a potential enemy that possesses large numbers of personnel and cheap equipment to throw at us in the event of a shooting war.

Chinese thinking has long revolved around the ability to win a war without having to fight one. Despite having blundered into a war in Ukraine, much of Russian strategic thinking follows the same logic. Why fight the west when you can undermine it? Unconventional warfare is a better way of achieving your objectives. If warfare is the continuation of politics by other means, unconventional or hybrid operations  are warfare by other means.

Recently we have seen: attacks on undersea gas pipelines & threats to fibre optic cables. Chinese fishing vessels intruding into disputed waters in the South China Sea; Spy balloons drifting over the USA; Russian cyber-attacks on Ukrainian critical national infrastructure, before the invasion of 2022. This is in addition to disinformation and Deep Fake efforts to disrupt elections, or to promote adversarial narratives on social media. So called Hybrid warfare and the use of cyber enabled measures to influence opinion, or to attack critical infrastructure have become part of the modern Statecraft tool kit being used against western interests. How can Europe respond to these developments?

Russian calculations about western resolve have been borne out by the response by European governments to the invasion of Ukraine. There was initially reluctance by many governments to commit to supply the weapons needed to repel the invader. Subsequently there was reluctance to subscribe to a list of comprehensive sanctions against individuals and companies. The reason was easily understood, many countries have developed deep trading relations with Russia and are reliant on a supply of Russian gas to heat their homes and offices.

There is now a serious debate going on throughout European civil society about how resilient our societies are in the face of fake news amplified through social media. In 2024 countries with more than half of the world’s population will go to the polls to choose a new government. How easy would it be for a malign state to seek to influence the outcome of a national election? Many European states have coalition governments comprised of three or four parties, each of which will want its share of ministries and policy leads.

In Europe there is a need for vigilance with regard to those countries who seek to join the European Union or NATO. Russia has been active in the Balkans region and in Moldova, seeking to destabilise pro-western regimes. Bosnia Herzegovina and Georgia have expressed their desire to join NATO as has Ukraine. Destabilising a pro-western government could be the ambition of the Kremlin. The delay in ratifying Swedish membership of the NATO Alliance shows the effect one blocking vote can have. This matters because the implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in a time of crisis requires unanimity. Imagine how a delay to this process might advantage Russia if it undertook an incursion into NATO territory.

Both Russia and China pursue measures against western democracies that seek to undermine confidence in democratic structures. Belgian police arrested a far right politician working for Chinese interests. Russian GRU operatives visited Catalonia at the time of the independence referendum in 2017.

Western democracies need to equip themselves with sufficiently robust legislation to close loopholes in civil society that allow fake news to circulate. This should be the business of law makers in European democracies and EU institutions. National Security agencies should ensure that measures are taken to counter disinformation and where possible to identify the source. A credible military capability can act as a deterrent to efforts to destabilize vulnerable countries. The British Army has a designated unit 77th Brigade to address the Hybrid warfare threat and specialist Ranger regiments that provide support for friendly governments when requested.

Eurodefense will engage with this important question; how can we keep ourselves safe, and how can we do so in a way that safeguards and respects our values as democratic societies? What measures can be enacted at the European level? What measures should be the preserve of national security agencies? Eurodefense will endeavour to keep this area of defence and security policy in the public eye and in the minds of policy makers.

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Ukraine statement by ED presidents


28 March 2022

The Presidents of the EURODEFENSE network of defence and security specialists across Europe,
meeting today

  1. Condemn in the strongest possible terms the invasion of Ukraine.
  2. Congratulate and admire the Ukrainian people for their courage in the face of Russian aggression.
  3. Note the rapid reaction of the European Union and nations in their support of Ukraine.
  4. Recognise that further massive European aid will be necessary to support refugees and to rebuild Ukraine.
  5. Welcome the commitment of European nations to accelerate meeting or exceeding their NATO spending targets.
  6. Believe that a collective approach to defence, security and resilience is more important than ever.
  7. Resolve to continue with renewed urgency the network’s studies on practical steps to mutual defence.